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Philonous: And are sensible qualities 
anything else but ideas? 
Hylas: How often have I acknowledged 
that they are not? 
Philonous: But is not motion a sensible 
quality? 
Hylas: It is. 
Philonous: Consequently it is no action. 
Hylas: I agree with you. And indeed it 
is very plain, that when I stir my finger, 
it remains passive; but my will which 
produced the motion, is active. (BER-




Resumo: O Monismo Anômalo é caracterizado por duas teses funda-
mentais: (1) que o mental é indeterminado (anômalo); e (2) que racio-
nalizações são explicações causais, mais especificamente, que elas são de 
um tipo que depende da identificação de particulares mentais – eventos 
– que têm eficácia causal. Este texto critica a tese da indeterminação de 
um modo limitado, somente na medida em que ela está baseada na 
concepção das racionalizações como dependendo de uma específica me-
tafísica da ação: o particularismo. Eu procurarei mostrar que a explica-
ção das ações em termos da explicação da ocorrência de particulares é 
equivocada. Positivamente, proporei que o agente é o causador, não de 
suas ações, mas dos resultados de suas ações. Consequentemente, as a-
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ções podem ser concebidas como causações de eventos por parte de um 
agente, elas serão, então, causações dos resultados das ações do agente. 
Essa proposta claramente explora a possibilidade de que as ações elas 
próprias não sejam eventos. Eu aqui pretendo somente dar relevo a essa 
possibilidade, porque eu a vejo como um caminho não-explorado na 
discussão corrente sobre o tópico. 
Palavras-chave: Monismo Anômalo; indeterminação do mental; parti-
cularismo na agência; ações e eventos. 
 
1. Two ideas by Donald Davidson seem to be crucial for 
all his thought on the nature of the mental. To the second 
idea is linked an argumentative strategy that aims to establish a 
monism, a token-physicalism. The first idea constitutes the gist 
of his early paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, and is pre-
sent in Condition 2 for the proper account of rationalizations, 
i.e. as causal explanations. Condition 2 reads: “A primary rea-
son for an action is its cause” (DAVIDSON 1963, p. 2). This 
idea is the idea that really to explain an action is to explain it 
as the consequence of the cause of the action. Davidson, since 
this paper, made many think that it is crucial for a genuine ex-
planation of action, not only that the action should be seen as 
reasonable for the agent given his beliefs and desires, but also 
that we point out what exactly it was that made the agent do 
what she did. Davidson ponders: “(...) A person can have a 
reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this rea-
son not be the reason why he did it. Central to the relation be-
tween a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the 
agent performed the action because he had the reason” 
(DAVIDSON 1963, p. 9). This is the “because” which for  
Davidson wears the trousers of genuine explanation and of 
which a philosophy of mind must explain the force. In general, 
the idea is motivated by the consideration that it is not enough 
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to credit an agent with a reason, rather to explain is to pin-
point the reason which led the agent to do what she did. Ac-
cording to Davidson, we not only want to know that subject A 
had a reason to visit her grandma in the hospital, but we also 
want to know why she went, or what comes to the same, what 
actually made her go. In his discussion with Melden apropos 
the case of the driver’s signalling a turn, Davidson maintains: 
“But of course there is a mental event; at some moment the 
driver noticed (or thought he noticed) his turn coming up, 
and that is the moment he signalled” (DAVIDSON 1963, p. 
12). And about this noticing or the driver’s thought that he 
did, Davidson remarks: “(...) It had better be the reason why 
he raises his arm” (DAVIDSON 1963, p. 13). It is hard to ex-
aggerate the influence Davidson’s construal of what it is to ex-
plain an action had1. 
The second idea, in fact a whole conception, is that of the 
indetermination or the anomalousness of the mental. For the 
moment, I would like only to point out the dialectical connec-
tion of the two central ideas in Davidson’s philosophy, i.e., to 
stress the fact that Davidson developed an argument for the 
ontological part of his position using a specific strategy. The 
anomalous character of the mental is used as a premise in an 
argument of which the conclusion is token-physicalism. This is 
not unimportant. It is rather crucial for the way Davidson 
wants to reach his conception in the seminal paper “Mental 
Events” (1970). It is important for him to develop what was 
correctly identified as (by Jennifer Horsnby) a less direct route to 
monism2. The point is: Davidson did not want to argue that 
mental events are physical directly, i.e., by showing that they 
are law-governed even while conceived of as belonging to men-
tal kinds. What we have instead is the following. Mental 
events are conceived of as nonetheless subjected to laws, and 
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are thus far necessarily physical3, and this is established through 
the intermediation of two considerations: (1) that of the causal 
intercourse of the mental with all phenomena (the principle of 
the causal interaction of the mental and the physical – premiss 
1 in Davidson’s argument) and (2) that of the involvement of 
any causal intercourse with nomologicality (the principle of 
the nomological character of causality – premiss 2)4. So, pre-
miss 3 – the anomalousness of the mental – ensures the indi-
rectness of the approach and gives a specific identity to its 
physicalism: of tokens. 
Having mentioned the two fundamental ideas of David-
son, let me now refer to the main criticism Anomalous Mo-
nism has received: that the position is epiphenomenalist about 
the mental. There have been many rounds in the fight be-
tween accusers and defenders, including Davidson with his 
“Thinking Causes”5. It is possible that many should think this 
issue is already settled. Nonetheless, at a further remove, the 
point I want to make in the present paper can be seen as an 
accusation that Anomalous Monism, in spite of its emphasis 
on the anomalousness (which is intended as a defence of the 
autonomy and relevance of the mental), threatens to lose the 
causal efficacy of the mental as we ordinarily understand the 
phenomena related to it. Self-evidently, not as Davidson 
thinks about the phenomena in question. And in this, 
Anomalous Monism as such is brought into question. It is as 
Hornsby puts it: 
The feeling that Davidson’s theses conflict may be based in a 
sense of conflict between the picture one gets of the operation 
of mental events if one accepts Davidson’s version of monism 
on the one hand, and a picture of how we understand people 
(HORNSBY 1997, p. 171). 
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Davidson’s commitment to the principle of the nomologi-
cal character of causality makes him uphold the view that 
whenever we rely on any causal notion we can be sure that 
there is a law involved in the case. But then the following 
question, again by Horsnby, becomes terribly important: 
Can we support this even while we assume that finding 
people causally intelligible is a ‘categorially different’ matter 
from understanding physical causal goings on? What are the 
grounds for believing that rational explanations themselves 
mention items that can be picked out in nomological vocabu-
lary? (HORNSBY 1997, p. 171). 
Accordingly, my aims in this paper are (1) to bring doubt 
about Davidson’s rationale for the anomalousness, the indeter-
mination of the mental, in so far as it is connected to the de-
sideratum of a view of the explanation of action that should be 
events-based. So, it is true that the anomalousness of the men-
tal is a premiss in the argument for a physicalist monism, and 
in so far it has to have independent support, and it has some 
in Davidson’s conception of the nature of mental content in-
volved in the propositional attitudes ascribed to people whose 
behaviour we try to explain (see next section). However, the 
just-mentioned desideratum gets involved in the general argu-
ment for the anomalousness, leaning as it does on a particular-
istic metaphysics of action. This brings me to my second aim, 
(2) to argue for the centrality of a question about whether ac-
tions are events. A determinate answer to this question prom-
ises to open up the way for a better understanding of agency, 
being agreed among opponents concerning this particular is-
sue that persons, agents, are – to use Strawson’s concept – one 
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2. According to Davidson, the anomalousness of the men-
tal is due to the fact that mental predicates do not allow “strict 
laws”. There are some elements – constitutive elements – that en-
ter constitutive principles, called by Davidson synthetic a priori, 
which define, some of them, nomologicality, or strict lawlike-
ness. E.g.: “hotter than”, “heavier than”, and “longer than” are 
relations that are transitive and asymmetric, and this is consti-
tutive of what our understanding of rigid objects is (Cf. 
DAVIDSON 1970, p. 115-23). “I suggest that the existence of 
lawlike statements in physical science depends upon the exis-
tence of constitutive (or synthetic a priori) laws like those of 
measurement of length within the same conceptual domain” 
(DAVIDSON 1970, p. 221). Now, mental predicates have fea-
tures that make them in fact incompatible with those features 
that allow nomologicality. Mental predicates are related to an-
other set of constitutive elements issuing a different set of con-
stitutive principles, e.g., maximization of rationality. 
Davidson writes in “Psychology as Philosophy”: “(...) The 
satisfaction of conditions of consistency and rational coher-
ence may be viewed as constitutive of the range of applications 
of such concepts as those of belief, desire, intention and ac-
tion” (1974, p. 237). The approach to behaviour that David-
son has in mind is one according to which when we try to un-
derstand people’s behaviour by attributing to them proposi-
tional attitudes what we do is to interpret their behaviour. And 
to do that, we have to use the whole system of the agent’s be-
liefs and motives. Now, when we in fact infer that system from 
evidences in behaviour, we necessarily use notions of coher-
ence, consistency and rationality so that we end up attributing 
to the agent a system of beliefs that is maximally coherent and 
rational6. This imperative of maximization of coherence and 
rationality in interpretation is a constitutive element in the as-
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cription of mental states in psychology. Davidson also uses this 
type of point to defend that the correct approach to the men-
tal should be holistic, which therefore precludes reductionistic 
definitions of the mental in terms related to mere behaviour7. 
The general point being made is that the constitutive ele-
ments of the mental are necessarily neglected when we try to 
pigeonhole them in physical theories, basically because consid-
erations of rationality are not constitutive elements in our 
conception of the nature of physical objects. The standard ar-
gument here runs as follows8. If p is the proposition stating 
that there are 15 oranges in my basket and q is the proposition 
that states that there are at least 5 oranges in my basket, then, 
as p implies q, principles of rationality require that if the little-
boy Phillip believes p then he cannot belief non-q, on the con-
dition that he knows basic arithmetic. Now if there were cer-
tain psycho-physical laws linking the belief that p with neu-
ronal state M and the belief that non-q with neuronal state N, 
then, these laws should allow the inference that if someone is 
in state M she cannot be in state N. But, with this we would be 
doing something unacceptable, which is letting an “ought” to 
intrude the context of the physical and its laws, since what 
could it mean to say that someone cannot be in a neuronal 
state based on what she ought to believe when we are dealing 
with laws which relate neuronal states distinct from one an-
other? 
This is why Davidson asserts that if we subsumed the 
mental to physical predicates this would amount to “changing 
the subject”, i.e., “deciding not to accept the criterion of the 
mental in terms of the vocabulary of the propositional atti-
tudes” (1970, p. 216). 
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3. Now, Davidson intends that all this should sit quite 
comfortably beside condition 2 for the explanation of actions, 
i.e.: “A primary reason for an action is its cause”. Let us exam-
ine this companionship. The issue to be put under discussion 
is the demands Davidson’s causalism about agency present to 
his doctrine of the anomalousness of the mental. How are the 
two central ideas of his position theoretically related to each 
other? So, what are the requirements, the terms in which 
Davidson presents his causalism? 
I. When Davidson says that an action is caused by a pri-
mary reason, he means by an action a bodily movement (a 
“primitive action”). This is an important element of what may 
be called the “standard story about action”9. So, an action is 
an event and we get from Davidson an answer to the funda-
mental question of the philosophy of action, i.e. which events 
are actions? (cf. DAVIDSON 1971). Davidson’s answer being, 
clearly: those caused by primary reasons. So actions are events, 
particulars, which form a special category by being concrete, 
spatiotemporal entities which are non-repeatable. Davidson’s 
position is quite clear about one specific point here. Suppose 
that X steals the money by taking it from the drawer. Accord-
ing to Davidson, X’s stealing of the money is the same event as 
X’s moving her hands in taking the money from the drawer. 
So X’s stealing was her moving her body, even though we de-
scribe that movement as – for Davidson – the action it was be-
cause of the effect the movement had (cf. 1971, p. 57-9). 
II. As we saw, to explain an action is, according to David-
son, to identify the cause of why it happened, i.e., the primary 
reason that caused that action, that bodily movement. 
III. These two elements build up what deserves the quali-
fication of an events-based account of action and agency (Cf. 
HORNSBY 2004, p. 4). It is crucial to note that such an ac-
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count involves not only element one, but also element two, 
that is, it not only accounts for actions as bodily movements 
redescribable by their effects, but also accounts for the whole 
phenomenon of agency by saying which events are actions be-
cause caused by other events, their primary reasons. So, the 
phenomenon of agency is accounted for by claims about par-
ticulars, events (Cf. idem). 
From all this one central point bears on the topic of the 
anomalousness of the mental. Because events must be on the 
offing when we speak of actions, we have to account for what-
ever anomalousness of the mental in terms of the features of 
those other events that are the causes of actions. We have to 
end up saying how and why those particulars constitute a 
whole, a system, being crucial taking into account its peculiar 
features of coherence, consistency and rationality. Davidson’s 
rationale for the anomalousness of the mental resides, there-
fore, on the one hand, on the centrality of the criterion of the 
mental which resides in the vocabulary of the propositional at-
titudes; and on the other hand, on the needs of the unavoid-
able process of interpretation in the attempt to understand 
agency, i.e., in terms of the genuine explanation of actions, that 
is, in terms of mental causes as events. Interpretation, for 
Davidson, is interpretation of behaviour, which needing to be 
interpreted is in fact explained; and so we end up getting in-
volved with the theoretical commitments of an events-based 
account of action and agency. At bottom, then, what we get is 
a rationale for the anomalousness that stresses the shortcom-
ings of a system of beliefs and, in general, propositional atti-
tudes as particulars which fail as such to live up to the demands 
of “strict law” or nomologicality. Now, events-based accounts 
of action and agency have been criticised, which opens up one 
other theoretical possibility for the anomalousness of the men-
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tal. By presenting one such criticism, mainly by Jennifer 
Hornsby, of two central elements of the events-based account 
of action in the continuation I intend to bring support to the 
claim that Davidson’s views on the anomalousness are thus far 
defective. 
 
4. The first central element of the events-based account of 
action is the constitution of every action by an event. As a mat-
ter of fact, “action” has become – in spite of Davidson’s men-
tioning of “our practical lore” (1970, p. 219) – a philosophical 
term of art, a semi-technical term. Actions so conceived are al-
ways events, particulars that are bodily movements. So we only 
have the phenomenon of agency where we have action so con-
ceived. However, it seems possible that someone might do 
something intentionally without there being any action so un-
derstood, that is, without such an “action” we would still have 
a doing of something. It seems possible for someone to do 
something intentionally without existing, as it were, any “posi-
tive performance” on the part of the agent10. 
Take the case of the subject refraining from taking an-
other glass of wine. She did not move, there was no movement 
on her part, she stood still. It is beside the point to suppose in 
this case that there was a tensing of the muscles in this refrain-
ing, because we can certainly tell a story so that there simply is 
no such event, supposedly up to the rescuing operation here. 
Think of a case where there simply is no event, no particular, 
which would be an appropriate candidate for the subject’s do-
ing what we all certainly allow was her doing something inten-
tionally. The crucial issue is that we may concede that, as 
Hornsby puts it, “there will be plenty of events in the region of 
[the] agents at the time at which they do their things”11, but 
this is of no avail given that we would be needing that the 
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event in question be a particular which is a person’s intention-
ally doing a thing, and this is what is not the case with these 
other events, they are not what warrants that the person is do-
ing something intentionally by not moving at all.  
So, an events-based account of action is committed to 
bodily movements that are spatiotemporal particulars, happen-
ings we can see. However, there seem to be cases, of omittings, 
refrainings, lettings-happen which are bona fide cases of doings 
intentionally, but which are not “positive performances”; so 
where there is, on such an account (in its own sense), no ac-
tion12. Thus far, the account fails to deal with such cases, about 
which we would allow that they were intentional doings13. 
The second central element of the events-based account of 
action is its commitment to what I have presented as one of 
Davidson’s fundamental ideas: the conception of action-
explanation as necessarily a causal explanation that speaks of 
particulars, events, which are the causes of specific bodily 
movements, also particulars, events. But what is it to explain 
an action? Must we be committed to antecedent particular 
events if we are willing to accept that explanations of actions 
are, at the bottom, causal explanations? What do we want to 
explain in the explanation of actions? Is it the occurrence of 
non-repeatable spatiotemporal entities: particular bodily 
movements? 
The point made about the first element can be of help 
here. If there are intentional doings without “positive per-
formances” and explanations thereof, is it necessary to pin-
point an event in terms of which we will explain an “action”, is 
it really this we are doing when we explain why someone did 
something by appealing to her beliefs and desires? Can we not 
get along explanatory-wise even without any attention, as it 
were, to such “positive performances” and what they seem to 
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require? If we can, this would imply that what we want in so-
called explanations of actions is to know why someone did 
something, and not why a particular event happened in space 
and time as a bodily movement. Now, this seems to be of im-
portance even for cases which, according to the standard story 
about action, involve events, bodily movements. For if that 
type of approach to explanation of action could be generalised, 
then it is not the occurrence of a bodily movement that gets 
explained in these explanations, but rather why the agent did 
what she did. According to this approach, an action-
explanation is not in fact geared to the occurrences of events, 
but rather to agents and their doings. 
An action-explanation tells one about the agent: one 
learns something about her that makes it understandable that 
she should have done what she did (HORNSBY 1997, p. 8). 
So when B pours A another glass of wine, we do not want 
to know why there happened the event of B’s body going 
through a movement. What we want to know is why B is do-
ing this, is she intending to get A drunk or whatever? Hornsby 
summarises well the whole point: 
An action-explanation is not a reply to a question about 
why some event occurred, and, in revealing what an agent 
thought and what she wanted, it does not introduce any singu-
lar term for ‘the cause’. Rather it shows a person’s doing some-
thing to make sense by seeing her as (at least approximately) 
rational – as conforming (more or less) to norms of consis-
tency and coherence in her thought and practice. Since its fo-
cus is how things are with her, it is no wonder that no ‘purely 
causal’ statement can be extracted from the explanation. The 
objective is to see a causally complex whole – a person – in a 
certain, intelligible light; and this fits ill with the idea of locat-
ing an item on which an event that happens to be an action 
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may be seen to follow in the way things do, nomologically 
speaking (1993, p. 172). 
So, where does this lead us to? 
 
6. From the centrality of agents, revealed in what I said we 
do want to get in action explanation, we could move to a view 
of agent causation. However, it better not be the conception of 
the agent as operating as the action’s cause, i.e., actions as 
events caused by agents. Agents would not be the cause of their 
actions. Agents may, nonetheless, be causers, of the events that 
result from their actions. 
Going back to refrainings, omittings and lettings-happen, 
I have argued that these are things we do intentionally without 
there being any “positive performance” by the agent. Should 
we say they are actions? It depends. According to Davidson’s 
standard story about action we saw that we cannot; notwith-
standing his pleading that we should “interpret the idea of a 
bodily movement generously” (1971, p. 49) (is it not danger-
ously generous, to the point of meaninglessness?) But perhaps 
even for a completely different view of agency, in which agents 
as causers becomes a central element, we should say no to that 
question. If an agent is someone or something that makes 
things happen, and this is to cause an event, to exercise the 
power to cause, we could have that – not that actions are 
events caused by agents – but that an action is a causing of an 
event by an agent. From this perspective, the event caused by 
the agent’s action is not her action, and this causing which is a 
causing of an event is not an event. An action would then be a 
causing of an event by an agent; the result of an action is that 
very event. But, then, about refrainings, etc, because there is 
no event the agent’s action caused, even though this was all in-
tentionally done, there are no actions. Failing to signal and re-
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fraining from waving her arm may be intentional, but would 
not be actions. This is Alvarez and Hyman’s view.  
I trust it can be gathered from what has been said that the 
issue of whether actions are events is central. About this there 
is disagreement even among critics of Davidson’s events-based 
account of action and agency. I mean, e.g., Maria Alvarez and 
John Hyman on one side and Jennifer Hornsby and Helen 
Steward on the other. They agree on the importance of the 
distinction between the transitive and intransitive forms of a 
verb like “to move”14. Therefore, there is an ambiguity in the 
phrase “bodily movement”. Concretely, “a movement of B’s 
finger” may mean an action which consisted in B’s moving of 
his finger r – this is B’s making his finger move, corresponding 
to the transitive form of the verb – or it may mean the result of 
such action, the movement of B’s finger – which corresponds 
to the intransive form of the verb (or it may mean, though this 
is not the relevant context here, a movement that is neither an 
action nor the immediate result of one by B). The importance 
of this distinction in this context is that without it we cannot 
avoid the conclusion that agents cause their actions in an ar-
gument as the following: 
 
A moves his finger. 
A causes a movement of his finger (I). 
His action is a movement of his finger (T). 
Conclusion: A causes his action. 
 
But when the phrase “movement of his finger” occurs 
with different meanings in (2) and (3), then we can avoid hav-
ing to accept the conclusion. But is it not then necessary that a 
causing of a movement by an agent – a causer – should not be 
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an event, on pain that there would not be any direct agency by 
an agent?15 
 
7. Even though, according to Richard Moran, Elizabeth 
Anscombe has the view that actions are events, the main fea-
tures of the type of knowledge of actions we have would, it 
seems, fit well with an account such as Alvarez and Hyman’s. 
Practical knowledge, this knowledge which is “the cause of what 
it understands”, is characterized by “intentionality”, it depends 
crucially on the “specificities of certain descriptions”. “(…) In 
referring to some event as a intentional action, we are con-
strained to descriptions that will capture ‘what happened’ as 
something the agent had a reason to make happen, and this 
provides us with a way to circumscribe the extent and specific-
ity of the agent’s practical knowledge. For when an action is 
successful, it extends as far as the descriptions under which the 
agent has reason for pursuing the end which his action is 
aimed at realizing”16. However, the importance of this point 
about this kind of knowledge is not epistemological; it con-
cerns rather the metaphysics of action. “(…) Anscombe’s con-
ception of practical knowledge points to the place where one 
person’s conception of the action does not bear only an epis-
temic relation to the action (…), but rather also plays a role in 
constituting it as the action it is. For practical knowledge, on 
her account, is a necessary condition for the thing known to 
be the sort of thing it is, vis. the agent’s intentional action” 
(2004, p. 67-8). This gives a specific type of privilege to the 
perspective of the person on her own actions (not making fail-
ures and mistakes impossible though), because without it there 
would not be the sort of thing we would like to know about 
others, i.e., what they are up to, what they are doing. “An ob-
server can be said to see straight off what someone is doing 
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only if he is entitled to assume that the agent himself knows 
what he is doing without looking. The agent himself cannot 
know what he is doing intentionally by looking, if that means 
only by looking. For if he can’t know this non-observationally, 
in the manner of practical knowledge, then there is nothing of 
the right kind for another person to see him doing” (2004, p. 
68). 
These views are one with Hornsby’s points to the effect 
that the “standard story of action” leaves agents out (Cf. 2004) 
and that action is essentially a phenomenon known, and also 
only real, from the “personal point of view”17.  
The ontological part of Davidson’s position seems, then, 
to be in peril, even if the explanation of action is a causal ex-
planation. However, and perhaps as a development of this, it 
does not seem to be clear yet what we should say about the 
precise relationship between actions and events. 
Abstract: Anomalous Monism is characterized by two major theses: (1) 
that the mental is indeterminate (anomalous) and (2) that rationaliza-
tions are causal explanations, more specifically though, of a sort that 
depends on the identification of mental particulars – events – which 
possess causal efficacy. This paper criticizes the thesis of the indetermi-
nation in a limited way, only in so far as it is based on the conception 
of rationalizations connected with a specific metaphysics of action: par-
ticularism. I try to show that the explanation of actions in terms of the 
explanations of the occurrence of particulars in mistaken. Positively, I 
propose that the agent is the causer, not of her actions, but rather of 
the results of her actions. Consequently, actions may be conceived as 
the causations of events by an agent, they will then be the causations of 
the results of the actions of the agent. This proposal clearly explores the 
possibility that actions themselves are not events. I intend only to bring 
to the fore of the philosophical discussion of action this possibility, be-
cause I see it as the unexplored theme of much of the current discus-
sion of the topic.   
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Keywords: Anomalous Monism; indetermination of the mental; parti-
cularism in agency; actions and events. 
NOTAS 
1 Helen Steward (1997, p. 24) refers to Jaegwon Kim’s views 
on events and explanations as follows: “(…) For example, 
in asking why Socrates drank hemlock, we are asking for 
an explanation of why some individual event of Socrates’ 
drinking hemlock occurred, or that in saying that he died 
because he drank hemlock, we are referring to the particu-
lar, individual hemlock-drinking event which caused his 
death”. Cf. also op.cit. Chapter 5: “Particulars, Facts, and 
Causal Explanations”. 
2 Cf. “Agency and Causal Explanation” in: John Heil and 
Alfred Mele (1993, p. 169). This paper was reprinted in 
Jennifer Hornsby (1997). 
3 This does not intend to preclude the point made by 
Helen Steward (1997, passim, specially though chapter 8: 
“Token Identity Theories”) that the monist conclusion 
put forward by Anomalous Monism is intended as an im-
portant discovery about the nature of the mental, being 
thus far not an analytical claim. 
4 Cf. “Mental Events” (1970, p. 170). The importance of 
the principle of the nomological character of causality is 
stressed by many commentators and critics of Davidson. I 
would like to mention Hornsby (Simple Mindedness [1997] 
passim, but specially p. 78-80), Steward (The Ontology of 
Mind [1997] specially chapter 7: “The Network Model of 
Causation in Philosophy of Mind”) and John McDowell 
(“Functionalism and Anomalous Monism” [1985, p. 387-
98]). 
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5 Cf. Honderich: “The Argument for Anomalous Monism” 
(1982); Crane: “Mental Causation and Mental Reality” 
(1992); Davidson (1993), Kim (1993), McLaughlin (1993) 
and Sosa (1993) in: Heil and Mele: Mental Causation 
(1993). Cf. also Hornsby (1997, p. 170); and Steward 
(1997, Chapter 9: “Eliminativism and the Problem of 
Epiphenomenalism”, for a different approach on the im-
portance of the issue. Perhaps I should say that my criti-
cism of Anomalous Monism is that it is ephiphenomenal-
ist pace Steward correct claim: “(…) the ontological frame-
work in terms of which the problem of epiphenomenal-
ism is usually stated is a vestige of a way of thinking about 
mental causation which the emergence of the problem has 
itself revealed to be unfruitful. Token states have not 
helped us with the problem of mental causation” (1997, 
p. 258-9). 
6 Cf. op.cit.: p.231. 
7 Cf. “Mental Events”: “We know too much about thought 
and behaviour to trust exact and universal statements 
linking them” (1970, p. 217). 
8 Cf. Simon Evnine, Donald Davidson (1991, p.19). Cf. also 
Hornsby: “Physicalist Thinking and Conceptions of Be-
haviour” (chapter 7 in: Simple Mindedness [1997, p.122-5]). 
9 Cf. Hornsby: “Agency and Actions” ([2004] in: Hyman 
and Steward (eds): Agency and Action [2004]), passim. 
10 Cf. Hornsby (1997, p. 4-6). This is her coinage. 
11 (1997, p. 5). Cf. also: “But it seems most unhappy to say 
that a vigil is composed of changes. The whole idea is that 
everyone should be still and silent. Obviously, there will 
be changes occurring at the region of the vigil during the 
time at which the vigil takes place – metabolic changes in 
the participants and breathing for example – but these do 
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not seem to be parts of the vigil; the relevance considera-
tions associated with the concept of a vigil would surely 
exclude them” (Helen Steward [1997, p. 69]). 
12 Cf. Alvarez and Hyman (1998) for a different reason for 
the non-existence of any action in such a case. “Someone’s 
doing something intentionally needs not be an action, for 
refraining from causing a stir is something one can do in-
tentionally” (p.241n43). But, then, from this perspective 
an action is not a bodily movement as an event, but rather 
“(...) a causing of an event by an agent; the result of an ac-
tion is that very event” (p. 233). Cp. Steward who seems 
to maintain, at the one hand, that standings still and say-
ings (of) nothing are events, though because they do not 
involve change, they are changeless events: “To the extent 
that such events [standings still and sayings of nothing] 
can be intentional actions, (…) it is arguable that we ought 
not to exclude them from the class of events” (1997, p. 
70). So a vigil, a staying still, a demonstration, though oc-
currences and actions, are changeless events (cf. 1997, p. 60, 
62, 101). But, on the other hand, there is a place where 
she implies that it is wrong to count omissions and fail-
ures (presumably intentional ones) events (cf. 1997, p. 
157). So, Alvarez and Hyman are understanding events as 
involving change, which Helen Steward does not seem to 
do (cf. the criticism of the view in Chapter 2, “Events as 
Changes” in: The Ontologogy of Mind, 1997, p. 56-74). 
13 Cf. Hornsby (1997, p. 6), and her question: “Should the 
class of actions be so circumscribed that it is required that 
an agent move her body for there to be an event which is 
an action?” (1997, p. 5n6). 
14 Hornsby in “Bodily Movements, Actions and Epistemol-
ogy” (“Postcript: a disjunctive conception of bodily” in: 
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Simple Mindedness; [1997, p. 102-10]) seems to imply the 
distinction.  But she explicitly helds back from her former 
employment of the subscripts T and I to mark the distinc-
tion (cf. 1997, p. 91-2).  
15 What has to be clarified is what is in contention among 
the views of the philosophers referred. How can we know 
our way about in pronouncements like the following by 
Horsnby, when at some points they comes close to Alvarez 
and Hyman’s position? “What it will be important now to 
realize is that the agent’s role – as cause of what her action 
cause – still has application in connection with moving 
the body. (…) The movement of a foot is not an action: it 
is not an agent’s doing anything. It is not a mere quibble 
to insist that someone’s moving a bit of their body is their 
doing something, and that the movement they produce is 
not. For when the label ‘action’ is attached to bodily 
movements – to events which aren’t actions – the events 
which are actions (…) are left out of account. Proponents 
of the standard story identify actions with bodily move-
ments. And the identification gives their game away” 
(“Agency and Action” [1998, p. 20]). 
16 Richard Moran: “Anscombe on ‘Practical Knowledge’” 
(2004: 59). 
17 Cf. “Agency and Causal Explanation” (1993); and “Action 
and the Mental-Physical Divide” (the essay-introduction 
[chapter 5] to the part on agency in Simple Mindedness 
[1997, p. 83-92]). We should take care not to make a mis-
take here: the “personal point of view” is not the “first-
person perspective”, so the “non-personal point of view” is 
not the “third-person perspective”, but rather the “imper-
sonal point of view”. This implies that the “personal point 
of view” is not a view “confined to a particular self”. 
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